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c·ase No. 8518

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

W. C. · LAWLER and LAURA--·lt!.~~
LAWLER, his wife,
Defendant, and Appellants.

v.
WALTER H. REICHERT,
Defendant and Oounterclaimant as
to Earl D. Tanner, and Plaintiff
against George Beckstead as Sheriff
of Salt Lake County, Utah, and
Appellant,

v.
GEORGE BECKSTEAD, us Sheriff of
Salt Lake County, Utah,
Defendant in Intervention and
Respondent.
PETITION FOR REHEARING

and
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF.
ELIAS HANSEN
Attorney for Appellants
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
EARL D. TANNER,
Plaintiff and Respondent.

v.
W. C. LAvVLER and LAURA M.
LAWLER, his wife,
Defendant, and Appellants.

v.
WALTER H. REICHERT,
Defendant and Counterclaimant as
to Earl D. Tanner, and Plaintiff
against George Beckstead as Sheriff
of Salt Lake County, Utah, and
Appellant,

C.ase No. 8518

v.
GEORGE BECKSTEAD, as Sheriff .of
Defendant in Intervention and
Respondent.
PETITION FOR REHEARING
and
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH and
ITS HONORABLE MEMBERS:
Come now the Appellants, Walter H. Reichert, W.
C. Lawler and Laura M. Lawler, and respectfully petition
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this Court to grant a rehearing in the above entitled
cause upon the following grounds:
POINT ONE
·THE ·COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT THE APPELLANTS HAVE FURNISHED A STAY BOND ON THE APPEAL, AND IN STATING THAT THERE WERE LIENS ON
SUCH PROPERTY FO·R THE DEBTS OF THE LAWLERS
OTHER THAN THE M·ORTGAGE DEBT IN THE SUM OF
$7373.47.
POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSTRUE RULE
69(b) (1) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND/OR UTiAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943, 104-37-30, LAWS
OF UTAH, TO MEAN THAT A REDEMPTIONER WHO
REDEEMS PRO·PERTY SOLD UNDER A DECREE OF FORECLOSUR.E AiCQUIRES O·NLY THE INTEREST OF THE PERSON AGAINST WHOM SUCH REDEMPTIONER HAS A
JUDGMENT LIEN OR MORTGAGE.
POINT THREE
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSTRUE
U.'C.A. 1953-28-1-10. ·TO THE EFFECT THAT THE HO·MESTEAD EXEMPTION WAS NOT LOST BY THE MO·RTGAGE
FO'RECLOSURE.
POINT FOUR
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT BECAUSE
REICHERT PURCHASED THE ·CERTIFICATE OF SALE HE
MAY NOT CLAIM TO BE A REDEMPTIONER FOR AND
ON BEHALF OF THE LAWLERS.
POIN·T FIVE
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANTS GAVE A STAY BOND IN ORDER TO RETAIN
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED.
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POINT SIX
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FACTS
IN THIS CASE BRINGS IT WITHIN THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE OF UTAH, (U.C.A. 1953-78-36-3), AND,
THEREFORE, LIABLE FOR THREE TIMES THE AMOUNT
O·F RENT.
POINT SEVEN
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF U.C.A. 1953-78-36-7 APPLIES TO THE APPELLANT REICHERT, AND UNDER THE FACTS IN THIS
CASE SUCH PROVISION DOES NOT AID IN SUPPO·RTING
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST HIM FOR DAMAGES.

-----~-----

-Attorneys for Appellants

STATE OF UTAH,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE.

1
f

ss.

I, ELIAS HANSEN, hereby certify that I am the
attorney for the appellants herein; th~t he believes that
there is merit to the foregoing petition for a rehearing,
and that grave injustice will be done to the appellants
unles~s the errors complained of are corrected.

Attorney for Appellants
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ARGUMENT
In the cours-e of our agreement we shall avoid as
far as possible a repetition of what is s.aid in our original
briefs, but in order to present our argument in an understandable manner it will be necessary to touch upon
matters which were discussed in the briefs heretofore
filed. The question which we wish to raise by the petition
for a Rehearing and the order in which we shall discuss
the same is in the order stated in our petition for a
rehearing.
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT THE APPELLANTS HAVE FURNISHED A STAY BOND ON APPEAL,
AND IN STATING THAT THERE WERE LIENS ON SUCH
PROPERTY FOR THE DEBTS OF THE LAWLERS OTHER
THAN THE MO·RTGAGE DEBT IN 'rHE SUM OF $7373.47.

An examination of the record ''ill, \Ye believe, show
that the Court erred in its state1nent of the f.aets as
above indicated. \'le shall defer a discussion of the
issues in the foregoing staten1ents later in this brief
when we take up our discussion of \Yherein the appellants'
rights would be adversely affected if the facts \vere as
stated.
POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSTRUE RULE
69(f) (1) OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND/OR
UTAH CO·DE ANNOTATED, 1943-104-37-30, TO MEAN THAT
A REDEMPTIO·NER WHO REDEEMS PROPERTY SOLD
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UNDER A DEGREE OF FORECLOSURE ACQUIRES ONLY
THE INTEREST OF THE PERSON AGAINST WHOM SUCH
REDEMPTIONER HAS A JUDGMENT LIEN OR MORTGAGE.

In our original brief we discussed this phase of the
case .at considerable length, and cited a number of authorities and adjudicated cases dealing with the effect of
a redemption by a person who has a lien or judgment
against only one of the owners vv-hose property has been
sold to satisfy a mortgage or judgment upon which
two or more persons are liable. The Court, ho,vever,
does not discuss, and so f.ar as a ppear.s from the opinion
heretofore written, does not decide that question. We say,
does not decide that question because if, as the Court
stated in its opinion, the liens against the property here
involved were obligations of the Lavvler.s, said question
would not be necessary for a decision. If the judgment
of Clowes which was assigned to the plaintiff had
been against both Mr. and Mrs. Lawler, then and in
such case, of course, there would he no taking of Mrs.
Lawler's property to pay the debt of Mr. Lawler. Of
course, the fact that the Lawlers were husband and wife
would not change the law because in Utah a vvife is
not liable for her husband's debts. U.C.A. 1953-30-2-1.
Indeed a wife has an inchoate right in her husband's
real property which may not be! taken from her unless
she has made a relinquishment thereof. U.~C'.A. 1953-

74-4-3.
It is a matter of common knowledge among attorneys,
especially in recent years, that most property acquired
by a husband and wife the title is taken in their joint
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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name.s. So also is it quite common for title to real
propHrty to be taken in the names of two or more persons.
We direet the attention of the Court to these matters
because it is of vital importance to persons who take
title to real estate with other to know what might happen
to their interest if a mortgage thereon may be foreclosed, or if one of the co-tenants should suffer a judgment to be rendered .against him, and his interest in the
property levied upon to pay the judgment.
In light of the.se facts we again direct the attention
of the c·ourt to the authorities with a state of facts
similar to the facts in this case. On pages 8 to 15 of
our Reply Brief filed herein we have discussed this
phase of the case. We adopt what is there said in support of appellants' Petition for a Rehearing. It will be
seen from the authorities cited on page 12 of the Reply
Brief the Supreme Court of lllinois and New York
take the view that one who has an interest as a tenant
in common of real estate may not be deprived of such
interest where the prope-rty is sold to pay the debt of
another indebted tenant in common, and thereafter a
redemption had by one "\Yho has a lien on the interest
of one cotenant cannot by such reden1ption deprive the
other cotenant of his interest in the property. \V e also
there cite Vol. 3 of the 3rd Edit ion, pages 1884, Section
321, of Freeman on Executions. "\Yhere, in commenting
on the decision of a California court in the ca.se of
Eldredge v. Wright, 55 Cal. 531, he said:
"The absurdity of the proposition therein
announced is made manifest in that the redempSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion in such a case has no lien against the property of but one co-tenant and therefore no right
to make the property of the other answerable for
his debt."
In this ca.se there can be no escape from the conclusion
that if the plaintiff may retain the property here involved, it will be a taking of the property of Mrs. Lawler
to pay a debt of Mr. Lawler. The fact that such result
is accomplished indirectly should make no difference
because it is, of course, a uniform principle of law that
a result may not be accomplished indirectly that may
not be accomplished directly.
In none of the cases which have come to our attention has the constitutionality been raised of a statute
which thus authorizes the property of one person to be
used to pay the debts of another. The fact that an author
of the standing of Mr. Freeman has char.acterized the
results reached in the California case as being absurd
would seem to indicate that in his opinion a law so construed as to bring about such results is unconstitutional.
In our original brief we did not cite any authorities
de.aling with the bases for declaring laws unconstitutional. We hesitated to do so because the general principles which serve to determine when legislation and other
acts are constitutional and when unconstitutional are
so well established that we felt it would be indiscreet
to direct the attention of the Court to such principles
\Vhere the facts are so clear as they .are in this case.
However, in light of the fact that the Court did not
discuss the question of the constitutionality of an act
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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which may he construed so that the prop·erty of one
p-erson may be taken to pay the debt of another, we may
be pardoned if we direct the attention of the Court to
such principles.
We quote the following from Colley's Constitutional
Limitation, Vol. 2, page 736:
"Perhaps no definition is more often quoted
than that given by Mr. vV ebster in the Dartmouth
College ease: 'By the law of the land' is most
clearly intended the general law, a law which
hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon
inquiry and renders judgment after trial. The
meaning is that every citizen shall hold his life,
liberty, property and immunitie:s, under the protection of the general rules which govern society.
Everything which may pass under the form of
an enactment is not therefore to be construed the
law of the land. The definition here given is apt
and suitable as applied to judicial proceedings
which cannot be valid unless they proceed upon
inquiry and render judg1nent only after trial. It
is entirely correct, also in .assuming that a legislative enactment is not necessarily the law of
the land. The words 'by the law of the land' as
us·ed in the ·Constitution do not mean a statute
passed for the purpose of 'Yorking the wrong.
That construction 'v-ould render the restrictions
absolutely negatory, and render this part of the
Constitution into mere nonsense."
The la"r .above uotPd is of such general and uniforn1
application that this Court 'vould probably resent a citation of thP nun1erous sta tt~ and federal eases ":here such
doctrine is announeed.
e shall not be guilty of such
i1npropriety, but fihall be content to aga1n direct the

''r
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attention of the Court to the fact that so f.ar as Mrs.
Lawler is concerned, she has never had her day in court
insofar as the judgment asserted by the plaintiff shall
be satisfied out of her interest in the property here involved. She was not given notice that Paul Cowles
claimed a lien on Mrs. Lawler's interest in the property,
.and if she had been so informed, such information could
not result in taking her property to pay the debt of Mr.
Lawler. No trial was ever had as to the claim of a lien
by Cowles, the assignor of the plaintiff on the property
of Mrs. Lawler.
We again call this rna tter to the attention of the
Court not only because of its importance in this case,
but so that it may become known whether or not one
who is the ovvner of a tract of land as a joint tenant
or tenant in common which is subject to a mortgage may,
upon the foreclosure thereof, have all his interest in
the property subject not only to pay the mortgage debt,
but also the debts of his cotenant which have been reduced to a judgment. In our original Reply Brief we
have directed the attention of the Court to the cases
of Fischer v. Eslaman, 68 Ill. 78; Neilson v. Neilson,
5 Barb. 565, and Erwin v. Schefner, 19 John. 379. We
also again direct the attention of the Court to the statement of Freeman on Executions, 3rd Ed. page 1884,
Sec. 321, where it is said that:
"The absurdity of this proposition that a redemption by a person holding a judgment against
one tenant in common may carry with it the rights
of a co-tenant against whom the. redemptioner
seems manifest from the results reached, namely,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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that the p:roperty of the co-tenant is taken to pay
a debt which is not owing by him but by his cotenant."
In connection with this phase of the case we also
direct the attention of the Court to the well established
rule of law that one cannot do indirectly that which he
may not do directly. As applied to the facts in this case,
if Cowles or the plaintiff may not in a direct proceeding
against the Lawlers acquire the rights of Mr.s. Lawler
in the prop·erty here involved, he may not acquire such
right by the process of redeeming the property from
the mortgage foreclosure proceedings. There is, of course,
this further well est~blished rule of law, namely, that
the courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of
a law unless the same is raised. So far as we are able
to as·certain that question has never been passed upon.
If, however, the learned author of Freeman on Execution
heretofore mentioned correctly concluded that the California rule announeed in the case of Eldredge v. Wright_,
55 Cal. 531, is absurd, it would seem to necessarily
follow that a law which permits such results is of neces·Sity unconstitutional, that is, if a la'v is absurd because
it justifies the taking of the property of one co-tenant
to pay the debts of another co-tenant, it necessarily
follows that an ,alleged la"'" or rule of court, that brings
about such results, is unconstitutional.
POINT THREE
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING T.O CONSTRUE
U.C.A. 1953--28-1-10. TO THE EFFECT THAT THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION WAS NOT LOST BY THE MO·RTGAGE
FO'RECLOSURE.
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In our original brief appellants have discussed the
matter of the homestead rights of the Lawler:s, and
the fact that Reichert acquired such rights when the
Lawlers conveyed the property to him by a Quitclaim
Deed. In the opinion heretofore written the Court did
not diseuss or expressly pass upon that phase of the
case. Because of the importance of the matter of a homestead right not only as to the parties to this proceding,
but as to others who might find themselves confronted
with a situation such as is here presented, we wish to
ag.ain call this matter to the attention of the Court.
We can concieve of no ground upon which it may be
said that the Lawlers lost their h-omestead rights unless
it be because of the provisions of U.C.A. 1953-28-1-10. We
again direct the attention of the Court to the fact that
the Lawlers had no occasion to claim their homestead
rights in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings, .and
that prior to the time the plaintiff sought to redeem the
property the Lawlers asserted their homestead rights
by Mr. Lavvler serving on the Sheriff and recording a
designation of a homestead as by law provided. It will
be seen that the provisions of U.C.A. 1953-28-1-10 are
made expressly applicable only to the purchaser at the
sale. The Act provides that if the homestead claim is
not filed or served "as herein provided, title shall pass
to the purchaser at such sale free and clear of all homestead rights." To construe the act to include redemptioners who redeem the property after those entitled
to .a homestead have filed and recorded the homestead,
have fully complied with the Act, is to enlarge the IanSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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guage of the act far beyond its natural meaning. A redemptioner 'vith knowledge of the fact that mortgagors
were claiming a homestead, and the fact that tltey had
complied with the law even if belatedly, may not be
heard to say that he was mislead. Such redemptioner
must prevail if at all on a construction of the Act to
the effect that the mortgagors have for all time been
foreclosed from claiming a homestead exemption in the
property foreclosed.
After the foreclosure proceedings were had the
Lawlers retained the right to retain possession of the
property and to redeem the same within the six month
p·eriod.
This Court has held in the case of Panagopulos v.
Manning, et ux., _____ 1~~----- Utah __ j_t_r_ ____ , 69 Pac. (2d)
614, that the homestead right is founded on public policy;
that the homestead right unde·r the .statute and Constitution is an absolute right 'vhich neither the Legislature
nor courts can infringe, and exemption statute must be
construed to give effect to the objects 'vhich the fra1ners
of the Constitution and Legislature had in mind to secure
shelter and support to the fa1nily; that a homestead
right may be predicated upon title and upon possession,
and homestead exen1ption n1ay be asserted to protect
either one. If U.C.A. 1953-:~S-1-10 is to be construed to
mean that a homestead right is forever gone unless the
owner thereof con1plies 'vith its provisions before a sale
under a mortgage foreclosure proceeding is had, then
indeed doe.s such right rest upon a flin1sy foundation
and contrary to the expressed vie,vs of this Court in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the case of Panagopulos v. Manning, et ux, is not entitled
to "he bro.adly construed to accomplish its beneficial
purpose."
POINT FOUR
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT BECAUSE
REICHERT PURCHASED THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE HE
MAY NOT CLAIM TO BE A REDEMPTIONER FOR AND
ON BEHALF OF THE LAWLERS.

In the course of the opinion this Court said:
"Since Reichert, deliberately and on advice of
counsel with knowledge that Tanner was interested in redeeming this property, chose to take
an assignment from the Assurance Con1pany instead of a Certificate of Redemption, he is now
barred by that choice. So it is necessary for us to
determine what w.as the effect of that assignment
or the further rights to redeem this property
from that Sheriff's sale. An assignment merely
sets over or transfers the interest of one party
in certain property to another. Such an assignment does not have the effect of canceling any
rights which other persons have in connection
with such property."
We do not, if we could, contend that Reichert is not
bound by what he did. However, the only right, at most,
that Tanner had in the property was a lien on the interest
of :11:r. Lawler and the right to redeem the property
only if Lawler, or his assignee, failed to pay the amount
owing to the mortgagee, Pacific National Life.
The definition that is given by the Court to an
assignment would seem to be equally applicable to ,a
redemption. We quote the following definition of reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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demption from 76 C.J.S. 177, where numerous cases are
cited wherein redemption is defined. In the law of mort~
gage redemption is thus defined:
"Redemption as the term is us.ed in the law
o.f mortgages may be defined as a transaction
through which the mortgagor, or one claiming jn
his right, by means of a payment or the performance of a condition re-acquires or buys back the
title which may have passed under the mortgage
or ·divests the mortgaged premises of the lien
which the mortgage may have created."
Here again are numerous cases cited in support of
the text. To discuss the same would extend this brief
beyond reasonable limit.s. We quote the following from
the case of Layton v. Thayne, 144 Fed. (2d) 94.
"To redeem is to purchase back by paying
the obligation. Bouvier's Law Diet. Rawle's Third
Revision, Vol. 2, page 2852."
The foregoing case is from Utah and the Tenth Circuit
Court.
The definition there given is typical of the definition given in the other cases. It would serve no useful
purpose to review the cases because of the results flo"\\~ng
from an assignment of .a Certificate of Sale are the
same as those flo,ving fron1 the usual procedure followed
from a redemption, it would seem to be immaterial 'vhich
method is followed. In other words, as the courts upon
nurnerous occasions have said, it is substance not form
that is of controlling importance.
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There would seem to be no doubt but that if a redemption had been made by the L.awlers, the effect of
the sale under foreclosure would have terminated. It
is provided in Rule 69(f) (5) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure that:
"If the judgment debtor redeems, he must
make the same payments as are required to effect
a redemption by a creditor. If the del)tor redeems,
the effect of the sale is terminated and he is
restored to his former estate."
Thus, if and when the L.awlers redeemed from the mortgagee, they became vested with the title to the property.
The property thus redeemed would be subject to the
judgment liens the same as before the mortgage foreclosure proceedings were had. Assume, however, Mr.
Lawler instead of Reichert had gone to the mortgagee
Insurance Company and had asked and received an
assignment of the Certificate of Sale, can there be any
doubt but that the effect of the sale would have terminated and the Lawlers would have been restored to their
former estate~ Of course, in such case such liens as.
existed against the property of Mr. Lawler would continue to exist the same as if typical redemption had
been made. It would seem clear that if and when the
mortgagors pay to the mortgagee, who holds a Certificate of Sale, the same payments as are required to
effect a redemption by a creditor, the effect of the sale
is terminated and the mortgagors are restored to their
former estate. C.an it be said that the legislature intended
that, if a mortgagor chooses to go to the mortgagee and
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pays the amount owing and receive·d from such mortgagee an assignment of the Certificate of Sale instead
of some other papers, that thereby the mortgagor is
not restored to his former estate~ The important act,
the act that has substance, is paying the mortgagee what
is owing to him. Until a creditor has paid something
toward the redemption of the property he has no interest
therein. It is only if and when the mortgagor fails to
act that the creditor may redeem. A lien of a creditor
is not effected by the foreclosure of the mortgage except
in relation to the rights of the mortgagee whose mortgage has been foreclosed. If the mortgagor pays off
the mortgage and such payment is made evident either
by an assignment of the Certificate of Sale, or by .a
conventional redemption, the lien of a judg1nent or mortgage held by a creditor is not adversely effected. Indeed, ../.
if the Lawlers had paid out of their own pockets the
money necessary to pay off the mortgage debt, the
various persons who had a lien on the p-roperty of the
L.awlers would have become more valuable in that their
liens would not be .subject to the superior lien of the
mortgage. Be that as it 1nay, the point we wish to enlphasize is that the method by ·w·hich the rights of the mortgagee under the Certificate of Sale p-assed to the nlortgagors could not adversely effect those 'vho may have
had a lien on the property. The effect of the sale 'vas
terminated when the n1ortgagors n1ade their peace "\vith
the 1nortgagee, who held the Certificate of Sale. It should
further be observed that there is nothing in the la"\v or
rules of court vvhich prohibit or tend to prohibit or
penalize one who adopt.s a proceding such as "\vas here
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followed to secure the interest of the mortgagee. The
authorities generally teach that where a certain result
is to be accomplished .and a method for its accomplishment is designated that does not preclude nor render less
effective some other method calculated to accomplish
the same result.
The thought is thus expressed in the famous case of
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 L. Ed. 579,
where Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, writing the opinion
said:
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the Constitution and .all means which
are appropriate which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited but consistent with
the letter and spirit of the Constitution are constitutional. Obviously if there is a doctrine which
properly save an act from being unconstitutional,
by the same token such doctrine will save an act
not expressly prohibited from being impossible
to follow to accomplish the desired result."
\liewing the facts here involved from the part that
1f.r. Reichert took in this proceeding at the outset, it
may be observed that if l\ir. Reichert had merely redeemed the property in the names of the Lawlers, such
a transaction would doubtless made Mr. Reichert a
mere creditor of the Lawlers for the amount of money
advanced for that purpose.
It will be seen from the stipulation of the facts
and the Exhibits that W. C. Lawler executed a Declaration of Homestead; that both of the Lawlers executed
a Quitclaim Deed and delivered it to Reichert, and that
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the Pacific National executed and delivered to Reichert
an assignment of the Certificate of Sale. The Sheriff
was notified of these facts, and the instruments were
all placed of record before plaintiff sought to redeem
the property (R. 60-61). When such Certificate of Sale
was acquired by Reichert, the Lawlers, or their successors
in title, had the first right to redeem the property. Had
they done so the effeet of the sale would have terminated
and the Lawlers, or their successors in interest, would
have been restored to their estate. It is so provided by
Rtttle 69(f) (5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It
is apparent that the Lawlers did not have the money
with which to redeem, and therefore they conveyed the
property to Reichert.
Upon the Lawlers conveying the property to Reichert
he, as the successor in interest of the Lawlers, had the
first right to redeem the property. Thus after Reichert
had acquired the title to the property and the Certificate
of Sale, he, as the Grantee of the Lawlers and the Assignee of the Pacific National, had a clear right as the
Grantee of the Lawlers to redeem from himself as the
Assignee of the Pacific National the property here involved. It is not easy to see just ho"T that could be accomplished, but if it had been done there would be no
escape from the conclusion that "the effect of the sale
would be terminated and Reicherts, as the successor in
interest of the LRw1ers, '""ould be restored to their estate."
And, also, if Reichert had gone through such purposeless proceeding the plaintiff would have no standing in
court, and the appellants could not be charged 'vith
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rental or damages, much less treble damages. It is said
that the appellants knew that the plaintiff was interested
in redeeming the premises. The .appellant.s, however,
were not required to stand by and see if plaintiff's
interest materialized. Doubtless the plaintiff also knew
that the appellants were interested in redeeming the
property, and plaintiff knew that the appellants had
p.aid off the money owing the mortgagee before he,
plaintiff, parted with any money, and he also must have
known that any judgment lien that he had against the
property was not destroyed or deteriorated by what had
been done by the appellants.
POINT FIVE
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANTS GAVE A STAY BOND IN ORDER TO RETAIN
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED.

It will he seen from records on file herein that .a
Supersedeas Bond was filed by Reichert for the sole
purpose of staying execution on the money judgment
that was rendered against Reichert. The bond was
brought up at the request of Reichert, and will be found
at pages 96 and 97 of the Record. It will be seen that
such bond expressly provides that a judgment of $500.00
was rendered ag.ainst Reichert, and that he de.sires to
appeal therefrom. There is not even a suggestion in
the stay bond that Reichert sought a stay of the judgment insofar as the possession of the property was
concerned. So far as the Lawlers were concerned, no
stay or supersedeas bond was filed. There was .a cost
bond filed by all of the appellants, which bond is also
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made a part of the Record filed in this cause (R. 98).
That bond is in the amount fixed by the Rules of Court.
The appellants having failed and refused to file a stav
or supersedeas bond to stay the proceedings as to the
possession of the property, the plaintiff was at liberty
to take such steps as he deemed necessary to get possession of the property. He may not refuse and neglect
to exercise such right for the purpose of collecting rent,
especially three times the amount of the rental v.alue
of the property. Rule 62 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
o/

POINT SIX
THE ~COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FACTS
IN THIS CASE BRINGS IT WITHIN THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE OF UTAH, U.C.A. 1953-78-36-3, AND IN
HO·LDING THAT APPELLANTS ARE LIABLE FOR THREE
TIMES THE AMOUNT O·F REASONABLE RENTAL VALUE
OF THE PROPERTY.

The unlawful detainer statute of Utah is taken from
California. This Court has so held. Buchanan v. Crites,
106 Utah 428; 150 Pac. (2d) 100, 103.
In 1865 in the case of Reay v. Cotter, 29 Cal, 169,
the Supreme Court of California construed a statute
later adopted in Utah.
e quote at son1e length from
that opinion because the law there eonstrued is the
same as our law dealing with unlawful detainer. frhe
opinion in that case very rlearly construes that law·,
and the courts have frequently cited the construction
so given. From our research the courts haYe uniformly
approved and followed the construction there given
whenever called upon to construe a la'v comparable to
the California l~aw. It is there held:

''T
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"If a landlord sells the leased property and
assigns to the purchaser the lease, and the tenant
does not attorn to the purchaser or recognize him
as landlord, the purchaser cannot recover possession of the premises from the tenant under the
act concerning forcible entries and unlawful detainer; that the act was designed to afford .a
summary remedy for the recovery of land as
against a conventional tenant who holds over contrary to the terms of the lease there by releasing
the landlord fr:om the nece.ssity of resorting to
the more costly and dilatory remedy .afforded by
the action of ejectment. It was not intended to
apply to any case where the title to the land
could be made a question, but only to cases where
from the nature of the relation between the
parties no such question could be made because
prohibited by law. Where the conventional relation of landlord and tenant exists the law does
not permit the latter to dispute the title of the
former. He is estopped by his lease. Hence in
such a case the landlord is not required to make
proof of his title, but he may rest upon the lease
and proof of compliance on his part. In such a
case title is not and cannot be made a question.
Where however the conventional relation of landlord and tenant does not exist the latter is not
so estopped, there being no privity between him
and the plaintiff and he may deny the title of the
latter and put him upon proof of his reversionary
estate."
We have examined numerous cases where the acts
dealing with the question of forcible entry and detainer
and unlawful detainer has been involved. From such
examination we have found no case where an act comparable with the California law and our law touching
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unlawful detainer has been construed contrary to the
construction given in the case of Reay v. Cotter, supra,
and a great number of cases where the construction
given in that case has been adopted and followed. We
refer the Court to the following cases where other cases
of similar import are cited with approval and followed:

Jones v. White, 230 Ala. 144; 160 So. 239.
Denton v. Denton, et al., 190 S.W. (2d) 291. (Ark.)
Johnson v. Hampton, 266 S.W. 561. (Tex.)
Barber v. Todd, et al., 128 S.W. (2d) 290. (Mo.)
Hails Execs. v. Robinson, 191 Ky. 631; 165 S.W.
(2d) 163.
Hansen v. Fitzee, 197 N.W. 170; 183 Wi~. 25.
Doy.le v. Mullany, et al., 89 Mont. 201,295 Pac. 760.
White v. Veitch, 27 Wyo. 401, 197 Pac. 983.
Yori v. Phenix, 38 Nev. 277; 149 Pac. 180.
Sanders v. Thornton, 97 Fed. 863.
Dunne v. School Trttstees, 39 ill. 578.
Woodman v. Ranger, 30 Me. 180.
Twiss v. Boehmer, 39 Ore. 359, 65 Pac. 18.
That in effect is the view expressed by this Court
in Dunbar, et al., v. Hanswn, 68 Utah 398, 260 Pac. 982,
and Williams v. Nelson, 65 Utah 304, 307, 237 Pac. 217.
None of the cases cited in the opinion of the court in
this case are to the contrary.
It would also seem that by the doctrine of Christensen v. Hansen, 107 Utah 234-, 152 Pac. (2d) 95-±, the
Court could not proceed to try this case as one on unlaw·ful detainer.
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Not only is there a total absence of any evidence
showing or tending to show that the Lawlers were ever
tenants of the plaintiff, but the stipulation shows the
contrary. Thus it is stipulated that the Lawlers were
and had been in possession of the property quite some
time before the mortgage was foreclosed, but that "Since
December 29, 1955, the intervenor has had posses.sion of
the above described premises by and through the defendants, W. C. Lawler and Laura M. Lawler, who claimed
and still claim to be the tenants of the intervenor, and
the intervenor refused .and refuses to surrender the
possession of said premises to the plaintiff." (R. 62) As
we pointed out in our original brief, there is nothing
which shows or tends to show that Reichert could surrender the possession to the plaintiff. The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the stipulation is that
Reicherts, having agreed to permit the Lawlers to remain in possession, could not remove them from possession. The point we wish to direct to the attention of the
Court upon this Petition for a rehearing is that if the
Lawlers were the tenants of Reichert, they could not
be the tenants of the plaintiff, so that the plaintiff could
prosecute an action for unlawful detainer. Needless to
say, that unless plaintiff brings himself within the class
of a landlord pur.suant to the unlawful detainer statute,
he cannot recover treble damages. All of the cases we
have examined so hold. So also must the judgment for
$500.00 fail because the same is 3 times the rental up
to the date of the judgment.
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In this connection it will also be noted from a
reading of the cases above ·cited touching on actions in
unlawful detainer, that if the plaintiff does not bring
himself within the statute of unlawful detainer, he must
completely f.ail in the action, and may not recover on
some other theory.
POINT SEVEN
THE ·COURT ERRED IN H·OLDING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF U.C.A. 1953-78-36-7 APPLIES TO THE APPELLANT REICHERT, AND UNDER 'THE FACTS IN THIS
CASE SU·CH PROVISION DO·ES NOT AID IN SUPPO·RTING
THE JUDGMEN·T AGAINST HIM FOR DAMAGES.

It will be seen that U.C.A. 1953-78-36-7 is a part of
the statute dealing with unlawful detainer. That being
so, what we have said under Point Six is ap,plicable to
this Point Seven. The relation of landlord and tenant
does not and is not claimed to exist between the plaintiff
and either of the appellants, and, therefore, an act
dealing with th·at relationship has no bearing on some
other relationship.
Appellants pray that a rehearing be granted, that
the errors complained of be corrected, and that a judgment be made in conformity with the prayer of the
appellants as contained in their pleadings filed in the
Court below.

Respectfully submitted,
ELIAS HANSEN
Attorney for Appellants
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